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Abstract 
In this note, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of pricing games with product differentiation in relation with the 
extent of market coverage. It is a received idea in the IO literature that the horizontal and vertical models of product 
differentiation are almost formally equivalent. We show that this idea turns out to be wrong when the full market 
coverage assumption is relaxed. We then argue that there exist two fundamentally different classes of address-models 
of differentiation, although their difference is not perfectly captured by the standard horizontal/vertical typology.
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     1 Introduction
It has been recognized for long that the introduction of product dierentiation is instru-
mental in escaping from the Bertrand paradox. Address-models of product dierentiation,
as inspired by Hotelling (1929), are particularly suggestive. They make it explicit that,
in order to relax price competition, rms need a two-dimensional heterogeneity: prod-
ucts have to dier in at least one characteristic, but the population of consumers must
exhibit heterogeneous tastes as well. The relationship between these two dimensions of
heterogeneity is crucial in characterizing the nature of product dierentiation.
It is commonplace nowadays to distinguish between models of horizontal and vertical
dierentiation. However, the extent to which this distinction really matters for equilib-
rium outcomes is not clear. Several recent papers suggest that the horizontal and vertical
approaches of dierentiation are to a large extent equivalent. In particular, Cremer and
Thisse (1991) show that "every model belonging to a very large class of Hotelling-type
models (including all the commonly used specications) is actually a special case of a
vertical dierentiation model." This claim seems to be conrmed in Irmen and Thisse
(1998): their analysis of products' characteristics choices in a multidimensional setting
suggests that the dierence between horizontal and vertical characteristics does not really
matter.1 As a matter of fact, IO textbooks also seem to have chosen their side. They
focus indeed much more on similarities than on dierences. For instance Tirole (1988)
starts the analysis of vertical dierentiation by claiming that "The study of vertical dif-
ferentiation so closely resembles that of horizontal dierentiation...". Shy (1996), in his
chapter 12, builds the analysis of his vertical dierentiation model as a particular case of
the Hotelling model. Martin (2000) also emphasizes similarities between the two mod-
els. In a very recent contribution, Schmidt (2009) endorses a comparable point of view:
building on a theoretical set-up which represents a model of either vertical or horizontal
dierentiation depending on the interpretation given to the variables, he establishes some
policy recommendations which are invariant to the nature of dierentiation he deals with.
Curiously enough then, vertical dierentiation is also known to be a necessary condi-
tion for the niteness property to hold. Generalizing the early arguments of Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1983) show that under vertical dierentiation
there may exist an upper bound to the number of rms which may co-exist in the market
in the long run, even when entry cost is abritrarily small. This property is known as the
niteness property. Under this property, we may expect natural oligopolies to prevail,
though exclusively under vertical dierentiation. By contrast, the number of rms which
may co-exist under horizontal dierentiation tends to innity when entry cost tends to
zero. In view of the preceeding statements, this last result is surprising: if vertical and
horizontal models of product dierentiation are essentially two faces of the same coin,
why is it that, in the long run, they possibly lead to radically dierent equilibrium market
structures?
In this note, we argue that the similarities between the vertical and the horizontal
approach, as emphasized for instance by Cremer and Thisse (1991), Schmidt (2009) and
in most IO textbooks, are misleading. Those similarities are indeed formally established
by relying on a two-stage model where rms choose rst products' characteristics and then
compete in prices. The model is solved exclusively for the parameters' constellations such
1The reader is referred to Cremer and Thisse (1991) and Irmen and Thisse (1998) for additional
references on the distinction between horizontal and vertical dierentiation.
1that the market is fully covered. However, the extent of market coverage, i.e. whether
full coverage prevails or not in equilibrium, should be endogenous to any two-stage model
of dierentiation. Once partial market coverage is considered, a key dierence emerges
between the prototype models of dierentiation. In one class of models, akin to the
concept of variety dierentiation, rms may actually get rid of price competition through
product dierentiation whereas this is never possible under the other class, akin to the
concept of quality dierentiation.
2 An Example
Schmidt (2009) considers a population of consumers indexed by their type x. Types are
uniformly distributed in the [0;1] interval with a density equal to 1. Each type x is
characterized by an indirect utility function W(x;q;p) = u(x;q)   p. He consumes at
most one unit of product with attribute q  0.
Denition 1 A market is said to satisfy full coverage if and only if, at prevailing prices
all types x buy one product.
There are n  2 products with attribute qi  0, i = 1;:::;n. We assume that qi  qj
if and only if i  j.
Let us then characterize the type of dierentiation relying on the denition proposed
in Schmidt (2009):
Denition 2 A vertically (horizontally) dierentiated market is a market where con-
sumers have an identical (diering) preference ordering over the feasible product at-
tributes.
There exist dierent versions of the denition in the literature but the present one is
quite representative. In particular, it is perfectly in line with the more restrictive denition
put forward in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) or Tirole (1988) according to which vertical
dierentiation prevails when consumers agree on the ordering of products when they are
sold at the same price. This denition also captures the intuitive parallel which is made
between vertical and quality dierentiation on the one hand and horizontal and variety
dierentiation on the other hand.
As recalled in Schmidt (2009), it is also often convenient to rely on the following
complementary denition
Denition 3 The preferred product version of type x, ~ q(x), is the version that yields the
highest surplus to type x, when all feasible versions are oered at their marginal cost c(q).
Formally, ~ q(x) 2 Argmax u(x;q)   c(q)
Relying on this second denition, it is clear that in a model where dierentiation relies
on quality levels, the preferred product version should be the same for all consumers if
quality is not costly, i.e. if c(q) = c  0. By contrast, we expect this preferred product to
be specic to each x under variety dierentiation. Notice that this second denition is also
instrumental in checking whether the niteness property holds or not. To put it simply,2
2The interested reader is referred to Shaked and Sutton (1983) for a detailed exposition.
2the niteness condition holds whenever the preferred product is the same for all consumers
in the market. This condition is more demanding that vertical dierentiation as dened
above. As originally argued in Cremer and Thisse (1991) and recalled in Schmidt (2009), if
the niteness property does not hold, it can be shown that in equilibrium the choice of the
products' characteristics and the prices are identical in the vertical dierentiation model
with marginal cost being quadratic in quality and the Hotelling model with quadratic
transportation costs. Let us consider the following example which describes the two
prototype models of product dierentiation in the literature:3




Assuming that v is large enough to ensure full market coverage, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium is easily established. A little more work is required to establish the
equivalence with a Hotelling model under quadratic transportation costs, but not much!4
The corresponding specication of the model for this last case is:
Model H :U() = v + t +
(x   t)2
4
  p with n = 2 and t = 2q   1:
The basic intuition for understanding why this equivalence prevails is the following.
By assuming that v is arbitrarily large, we ensure that all consumers buy one unit either
of good 1 or 2. Firms therefore compete for market shares and products attributes matter
only for deciding which rm gets which side of the market. Only the price dierential
matters for the consumers and it is sucient to identify the position of the indierent
consumer to dene rms' demands. Let us then denote this consumer by ~ x(p1;p2) and
assume wlog that q1 < q2. It is immediate to see that D1(p1;p2) = ~ x() and D2(p1;p2) =
1   ~ x() in either model V or H. In such a case, the vertical or horizontal nature of
the dierentiation is formally irrelevant. In the vertical interpretation, the level of the
marginal cost being quadratic in quality, the low quality rm can always secure a positive
market share on the left of the interval whereas in the Hotelling interpretation, the rm
located on the left side always secures a positive market share at the left extreme of the
interval. In other words, the behaviour of rms' demands at the price competition stage
are the same under vertical and horizontal dierentiation. Moreover, the quadratic cost
assumption, be it on transportation cost or quality cost, ensures that this is the case for
all possible relevant price subgames.
We question now the robustness of this result to the full market coverage assumption.
To which extent should we expect to obtain a comparable equivalence should parameter
v not be arbitrarily large? The answer is almost immediate: we should not expect the
previous equivalence to hold anymore! By denition, if the market is not fully covered,
prices are such that for at least one consumers' type, the best available option is to refrain
from consuming, i.e. 9 x 6= 0 such that W(x;qi;pi) < 0, i = 1;2. The relevant question
is then : where do these refraining consumers locate in the [0;1] interval?
Let us start with model V . According to the specication of V (), all consumers agree
on a ranking according to which the preferred characteristic is the largest q. Therefore,
vertical dierentiation prevails. But more importantly, the surplus function associated
with this specication is strictly increasing in x. We may dene by xi the type x which
3The example is directly taken from Schmidt (2009)
4The interested reader is referred to Schmidt (2009) for a more general and detailed argument
3satises V (x;qi;pi) = 0. Since q1 < q2, 8x < x1, not buying is preferred to buy i. All
types x  x1 buy one of the two products. The following property immediately follows:
Result 1 In the case utility is dened by V () = v+q+xq p, for any feasible products'
characteristics, if the market is not fully covered, non buying consumers are located in a
unique sub-interval of [0;1]. Moreover, rms' market shares are necessarily connected by
an indierent consumer.
Firms' demands are dened by D2(p1;p2) = 1  ~ x, D1(p1;p2) = ~ x x1. Because rms'
market shares are connected, rms compete with each other even though the market is not
covered. This result must be contrasted with the specication of demand in a non-covered
market in model H. In model H, it is clear that the surplus function is not monotonic in
type x. More precisely, the sign of
@U()
@x depends on x   t. An immediate consequence is
the following result:
Result 2 In the case utility is dened by U() = v + t +
(x t)2
4   p, if the market is not
fully covered, the position of non buying consumers in the [0;1] interval depends on the
specication of the products' characteristics ti. Non-buying consumers may be located in
disconnected intervals and rms' market shares need not be connected by an indierent
consumer.
Suppose in particular that t1 =  1
4 and t2 = 5
4, which dene the equilibrium values in
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium under full coverage. Clearly enough, if v is such
that the market is not covered for some relevant price levels, the non-buying consumers will
be located in the middle of the [0;1] interval. Market shares are not connected anymore,
which implies that rms do not directly compete with each other but rather behave like
local monopolists. Summing up, we observe that, in sharp contrast with the fully covered
market case, the specication of demand functions at the price competition stage will
most often dier fundamentally depending on whether model V or model H applies. As
a consequence, payos function dier and the formal equivalence of equilibrium outcomes
disappears. To sum up, we may claim:
Proposition 1 The equivalence result established in Cremer and Thisse (1991) is not
robust to the introduction of non-covered market congurations.
This proposition is certainly not surprising. It nevertheless recalls that the similarities
between vertical and horizontal models of product dierentiation are over-emphasized.
3 Comments
In the previous section, we have shown that full market coverage was critical in establishing
the formal equivalence between some classes of vertical and horizontal models. We inves-
tigate now in more depth what is further revealed by the analysis of non-covered market
conguration. The scope for relaxing price competition depends on the way heterogene-
ity in products' attributes is combined with population' heterogeneity. By dierentiating
their products, rms actually decide of a particular sharing of consumers among rms
and between buyers and non-buyers. In this perspective, a key concern is the possible
4existence of a hierachy among consumers, as established by the rms. In order to better
assess the nature of product dierentiation, it may be useful to put the standard approach
on its head: instead of asking whether consumers are unanimous or not in their ranking of
products' characteristics (as in Denition 2), one may ask whether rms are unanimous or
not in their ranking of consumers' types. Consider the following denition of a "preferred
consumer", which is a mirror image of Denition 3:
Denition 4 The preferred consumer of a rm which sells characteristic q is the con-
sumer that benets from the highest gross surplus in the population when consuming prod-
uct q. Formally ~ x(q) 2 Argmax u(x;q)   c(q).5
Relying on this denition, one may wish to consider the preference ordering that rms
would establish over the set of consumers, depending on their own characteristics. In
model V , the preferred consumer is unique, i.e. his type does not depend on the pre-
cise characteristics chosen by the rms whereas it always does in model H. This mere
fact induces a very dierent structure of competition between the rms. Whenever there
exists a unique preferred consumer, as in model V , market shares are necessarily con-
nected at the price competition stage, whatever the products' choice made in the rst
stage and irrespective of the extent of market coverage. Firms remain direct competitors.
By contrast, in model H, rms dene their own ranking of consumers by deciding on
their characteristics. It may then happen that by dierentiating their products, the rms
induce a non-covered market conguration where they end up not competing with each
other because their markets are disconnected. To put it dierently, product dierentia-
tion induces heterogeneous rankings of consumers in model H whereas it preserves the
homogeneous ranking in model V .
Does the nature of dierentiation as dened by Denition 2 have systematic implica-
tions for the diversity of preferred consumers as dened with Denition 4? We may easily
think of vertically dierentiated markets in the sense of Denition 2 in which preferred
consumers dier depending on the products' characteristics chosen by the rms. Consider
for instance the following location model with linear transportation costs: consumers are
uniformly distributed in an interval [a ;a+] 2 [0;1]. There are two feasible locations:
f0;1g. Depending on whether 1
2 2 [a ;a+] or not, we may either have horizontal or ver-
tical dierentiation in the sense of Denition 2, but it will always be the case that a rm
locating at 0 has type a  as its preferred consumer whereas a+ is the preferred consumer
of a rm located at 1. In the same way, it is easy to build a horizontal dierentiation
model in the sense of Denition 2 but in which preferred consumers do not depend on
products' specications. This is for instance the case in the following set-up: the con-
sumers are splitted in [0;a1] and [a2;1] intervals, with a1 < 1
2 and a2 > 1
2. The space of
products' possible characteristics is dened as [b1;b2] with a1 < b1 < 1
2 < b2 < a2.
Does it matter then to know whether the primitives of the model, i.e. the specication
of consumers preferences and the distribution of types on the one hand, the space of prod-
ucts' attributes on the other hand, allow for dierent preferred consumers or not? If the
location of the preferred consumer depends on product characteristics, product dieren-
tiation is apt to create localized competition (in the limit, it even destroys competition).
This preserves the ability of each rm to sell to consumers with the highest surplus for
5We add c(q) so as to enhance the similarity with Denition 3 but it should be clear that cost actually
do not matter here.
5their products. If the converse prevails, only one rm will end up selling to the highest
surplus consumers, all the other ones will be conned to selling to "second-rate" con-
sumers. It is our belief that this distinction is a relevant one in various strategic contexts.
Consider for instance the order of moves at the product selection stage. Does it matter to
move rst? If the preferred consumer is unique, then playing rst ensures that a rm can
sell to its preferred consumer. Timing matter here. Another case in point is when rms
have several strategic tools at their disposal. Is product dierentiation robust to the pres-
ence of these additional commitment tools? In Boccard and Wauthy (2009) it is shown
that within the standard vertical dierentiation model popularized by Tirole (1988), there
exists no subgame perfect equilibrium in which rms dierentiate their products by qual-
ity when they are allowed to commit to limited capacity levels. The intuition underlying
this result is simple: since capacity constraints already limit drastically price competition,
rms are induced to both select the quality level which maximizes industry welfare, i.e.
they focus on the same set of preferred consumers, for whom the surplus is maximized by
selecting the best available quality. A comparable no-dierentiation result would never
obtain in a Hotelling model with capacity commitment. In the Hotelling model, each
consumer has his ideal product type, which actually implies that by choosing dierent
characteristics rms choose dierent preferred consumers. In such a case, maximizing
industry surplus requires product dierentiation for sure. The reason is not such much
related to the distinction usually made between horizontal and vertical dierentiation but
rather to the existence, or non-existence, of a unique preferred consumer, as induced by
the model primitives.
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